FRENOS & CONTRAPESOS. EL "RULE OF LAW": UN ESTUDIO DE CASOS
. Caroline C. Beer. "Judicial Performance and the Rule of Law in the Mexican States", Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 48, No. 3, Fall 2006.

Caroline Beer, profesora de ciencia política en la Universidad de Vermont, estudia el sistema judicial en dos Estados mexicanos (Guanajuato y Aguascalientes), y propone algunas conclusiones interesantes. En primer lugar, no resulta difícil percibir la ausencia de "rule of law":

"In isolated rural areas, local political bosses control the administration of justice. In the words of one human rights activist, 'here in contryside, violence is still the accepted mechanism of justice' ... In urban areas, where the government does manage the administration of justice, the poor tend to get long prison sentences, while the rich are rarely punished even for serious crimes".

Luego reseña el impacto económico de la ausencia de "rule of law", con énfasis en la pérdida de competitividad:

"An effective judiciary is important to international investors because a weak judicial system generates a high level of uncertainty and makes it difficult for businesses to remain competitive in a global market. The risks associated with operating in a country where the judiciary is too weak to protect property rights and enforce contracts may deter foreign investment ... Excessive delays, corruption, and incompetence in court systems increase risks and costs for business, decreasing the competitiveness of the economy".

Naturalmente, la perspectiva de un sistema con "rule of law" no es del todo agradable para quienes están acostumbrados al sistema:

"An independent supreme court may create obstacles for executives trying to push through unpopular economic reforms ... Moreover, business's central interest in controlling crime may not be well served by a judicial system focusing on human rights and due process".